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ABSTRACT
REPRESENTATION AND RESTRAINT: CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
FRACTIONALIZATION AND STATE-BUILDING
David Lian
April 26, 2019
This study seeks to understand the relationships between democracy, ethniclinguistic-religious (ELR) fractionalizations and state-building. The speed of a
country’s economic recovery from war is used as proxy to determine the statebuilding process. Using Cox PH model, I conducted a large sample hazard
analysis of 107 conflicts, having polity and ELR as explanatory variables. I found
that competitiveness of political participation and executive constraints are
associated with state-recovery while ethno-linguistic fractionalizations have the
reverse effect. I propose that the institutional feedback process is equal to the
product of negative executive power centralization and representation minus
fractionalization; as in F = – e (r – f). Positive feedback, as a result of higher
fractionalization than representation or due to high degree of centralization, leads
to a dynamic equilibrium that causes state weakness in the long run.
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EPIGRAPH

And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.
And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east,
that they found a plain in the land of Shinar; and they dwelt there.
And they said one to another,
Go to, let us make brick, and burn them thoroughly.
And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for morter.
And they said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower,
whose top may reach unto heaven;
and let us make us a name,
lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.
And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower,
which the children of men builded.
And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one,
and they have all one language; and this they begin to do:
and now nothing will be restrained from them,
which they have imagined to do.
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language,
that they may not understand one another's speech.
So the Lord scattered them abroad
from thence upon the face of all the earth:
and they left off to build the city.
Therefore is the name of it called Babel;
because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth:
and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.

Genesis 11:1 – 9 (KJV)
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The topics of state-building, political institutions and ethnic dynamics each
possess vast amounts of research and discussion in political science as well as other
discipline and inter-disciplinary areas. Ethnic power relations, conflicts and state failures
have significant implications on international security. One of the most serious challenges
the world face today are not just threats of conventional states against each other, but also
crises characterized by the lack of the political order and strong institutions. These
failures are often the consequences of intrastate, interstate war, or the combined impacts
of both. Ethnic adhesion and state-weakness can have devastating impact on the lives of
many people and threaten the prospects of peace and post-war reconstruction efforts.
Weak states often fall prey to various transnational security threats that produces
implications beyond their borders. These threats range from organized crimes, weapon
proliferation, terrorism, displacements, mass migration, epidemics, environmental
degradation, to cross-border insurgencies and conflicts (Rice and Patrick 2008).
Within the frame of regime characteristics, the scholarship approaches the causes
and persistence of conflicts as well as condition of state-building from a wide variety of
perspectives. Some argues that democracy promotes peace externally as well as internally
(Russett et. Al 1995, Ray 1998; Rummel 1997). Others suggest that democracy or rushed
democratization in the context of complex ethnic and religious bonds may not be as
simply helpful as it has been thought to prevent conflicts (Abulof and Goldman, 2015;
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Edward Flores and Nooruddin, 2009). However, little attention has been given to the
potential dynamics of the interaction between ethnolinguistic diversity and components
of polity in empirical fashion. Likewise, such interactions’ impact on state-building is
also given little empirical scrutiny. A concrete survival analysis of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization’s intercourse with characteristics of regime institutional arrangements
can be useful to draw a defensible conclusion to understand causes of state-weakness.
I conducted aggregate large-sample hazard analyses of economic recovery,
regime characteristics, and ethnic fractionalizations. The examination of a state’s speed
economic recovery from conflict, measured in terms of GDP per capita, is utilized as the
appropriate proxy in determining the aspects of state-building. The survival analysis is
concerned with the relationship between the amount of years it takes for states to reach
conflict recovery and explanatory variables of Polity IV components and ethnic,
linguistic and religious (ELR) fractionalizations. Through my findings, I established the
causal explanations of the interaction between power centralization, representation and
fractionalization and their impact on state-building.
I propose the institutional feedback process model as a way to understand the
prospect of state-building success in multi-national states. Central components of this
model are the levels of representation and centralization in state decision making
institutions and processes. Based on the scope of the analysis and findings, I argued a
country’s negative effects of ethnic fractionalization are diagnosed by facilitating
sufficient level of representations in successful multi-national states. State-weakness in
ethnically fragmented countries are caused by low representation and high centralization
of both symbolic and functional power, in which ethnic grievances accumulate in positive
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feedback cycle that is detrimental to both long-term stability of a state and may lead to
state-breakdown in the events of institutional thresholds such as war, as well as civil
conflict, revolution, regime change or abrupt power transition. Moreover, such states may
also be difficult to recover from these events.
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CHAPTER II: STATE, INSTITUTIONS AND WAR

The state, according to Max Weber, is “a human community that successfully
claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory” (Duncker &
Humblot 1919). The dissection of this definition gives the components constitutive of the
state: the human community, the territory, the legitimacy, and the present of monopolistic
use of force. A failing or fragile state in the modern context, therefore, possesses the
negative qualities of these components, such as a weak government and bureaucratic
apparatus that lacks sufficient rational-legal legitimacy and the exclusive coercive force
to maintain law and order. It is a state that is often encountered with strife over issues
relating to its territory and severe adhesion of its human community.
Following Huntington (1968), I define institutions as “stable, valued, recurring
patterns of behavior.” They are underlying rules of the game that organize social,
political and economic relations (North, 1990; Harper et al., 2012). Formal institutions
can be written constitutions, laws, regulations and policies enforced by authorities in
official capacity, while informal institutions include social norms, traditions and customs
that define behaviors (Leftwich & Sen, 2010; Berman, 2013). Strong and stable
institutions provide predictability. Huntington measured the strength of
institutionalization in the autonomy, coherence-disunity and the complex-simplicity
features. A strong institution is autonomous; its organizations and procedures are
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independent of the outside influence and insubordinate to the norms other than its own
(1968). This is to say that its reliance is not vulnerable to a group and its established
procedures can moderate the impact of the new group entering the political arena. A
healthy institution is coherent in a sense that the consensus needed within the boundary of
the institution is not prone to the external intrusions. Its complexity allows for prevention
of possible vacuum of power as the institution’s extra-elements can step in to be in
charge when the original element tasked to carry out the purpose was to weaken.
A regime, being a set of governing institutions, regulates the exercise of power in a state.
Representation is a vital and integral component of a democratic regime. The procedural
definition of democracy focuses on the process of electing leaders through a fair, honest
and regular election (Dahl 1971; Schumpeter 1942). Thus, a democratic regime based on
such definition would be that of possessing the institutional arrangements which facilitate
the government appointed through such electoral process. Proceduralists’ concepts and
arguments such as Robert Dahl (1971)’s polyarchy and procedural minimal for such
polyarchy to exist argue that certain conditions such as political and civil rights are
necessary to facilitate free and fair elections. The proceduralist notion of democracy
requires contestation and participation. For proceduralists, democracy is neither about
stability nor efficiency nor economic justice or single institutional package as a
constitution; these may be conditions more broadly included by the substantive
definitions with wide varieties of conditions. The conceptual measurements of democracy
are themselves diverse within political science, as much as the existence of various
patterns of democracy from consensus to majoritarian models, proportional to singlemember representations that impact the behaviors of parties, interest groups, voters,
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coalition formation frequencies, legislature performance, and executive-legislative
relations.

Ethnicity and Nationalism
It is established in the field of international relations that nationalism is a cause of
violent conflict among states (McCartney 2004; Cederman, Warren, and Sornette 2011;
Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Conflict could take place internally with the presence of
ethnonationalism or oppression of a national minority by the dominant group.1 The
scholarship on nationalism has put the focus on both the origin and the creation of
nationhood and nationalism. The multiple theoretical camps to explain such origins
include the primodialist, modernist and instrumentalist approaches. Primodialists such
Anthony Smith (1986)’s theory emphasizes nationalism’s ties to the ancient times; these
ties may be ethnic, racial or religious. These characteristics are carried by symbols,
values, memories, name, solidarity or the myths, especially ones containing the common
ancestor. The instrumentalist’s variety views of nationalism, asserting nationalism to be
of a tool (OLeary 2001), emphasizes the role of agency in their argument on the origin of
nationalism. For instrumentalists, nationalism is the elite strategy; assuming the rational
choice theory, stoking it is less expensive for the political elite than delivering economic
promises to the people. The dynamic relation between the elite and the populations
provided by the instrumentalist theory connect to the relationships between the state and
regime, the nation and nationalism, and the conflicts and cooperation.

1

See Greed-driven (Collier & Hoeffler 2002), Grievance-driven (Gurr and Scarritt 1989), Opportunitydriven (Fearon & Laitin 2003) theories on the initiations of civil wars
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Goldstone (2008) argued that “multiple pathways” to the failed state are the escalation
of ethnic conflict, state predation, regional or guerilla rebellion, democratic collapse, and
succession or reform crisis in an authoritarian state. His delineation of ethnic escalation
as a factor is also synonymous with the other scholars’ indication of state failure.
Benjamin Reiley and Elsina Wainwright’s (2005) identification of the indicators of state
failures in the South Pacific region, as more languages being spoken by Papua New
Guinea alone than in all of Africa. While ethnic diversity could be positive in which the
vast level of diversity could lead to unavoidable power-sharing that promote the
longevity of democracy, ethnicity could be exploited to undermine state legitimacy. This
is true especially when it is muddled with the effort to “mobilize support to achieve
economic gain” and the presence of disputes over land which had been the most precious
resource across the region. As ethnic conflict contributes to the state-weakness
(Goldstone 2008) and ethnic fractionalization is argued to be correlated to lower
development (Alesina et al. 2003), the following hypotheses are addressed:
H1: Higher levels of ethno-linguistic or religious fractionalization contributes to a lower level
of conflict recovery.

Democracy and State-building
Byman and Pollack (2001) point to the role of agency, as in the instrumentalist
explanation of nationalism, in the likelihood of violent conflict as charismatic leaders can
manipulate the national sentiment to make conflict more likely. Moreover, the power
being unchecked and vested in a leader is the characteristic of the lack of executive
restraint in which could be considered as an authoritarian feature. The theory of
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democratic peace (DPT) on dyadic peace established by conventional knowledge on the
likelihood of democratic regimes going to war ground itself on the fact that democratic
leaders are more accountable to their people. They also espouse norms of compromise
that makes use of force unlikely against similar regimes (Russett et. Al 1995, Ray 1998).
Likewise, the domestic democratic peace theories (DDPT) hold that democracies are also
found to have less frequency of intrastate wars, genocides, and democides as it pacifies
nationalism (Rummel 1997). The arguments might not hold in all cases. Abulof and
Goldman (2015) argued that in the context of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)
states where complex ethnic and religious bonds are present within a state, the more
democratic the regime, the more likely it is to devolve into a civil war; and suggested to
“democratizing nationalism” as the long-term solution for peace.
Several scholars have stressed the importance of sequences in democratization;
Mansfield and Synder (1995) suggest that creation of strong and capable governing
institutions should take precedence to the democratization. This argument also reflects a
broader anocracy thesis highlighting the higher frequency of transitional and intermediary
regimes between democracy and autocracy to erupt violence (Hagre et al. 2001). The
similar idea is reinforced Paris (2004) and Clague et al. (1996) who argued that rushed
democratization at an early stage of post-conflict period poses dangers to achieving
credible peace. The weak and immature democratic institutions provide the opportunity
for the autocratic hijacking of the electoral process, and the citizen’s resorting of arms to
pursue political goals due to the lack of strong civil society (Paris, 2004). Echoing Paris
and Clague et al., Flores and Nooruddin (2009)’s demonstrating the relationship between
early democratization and the likelihood of relapse into the conflict, argue for “managed
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transition to democracy” that likely involve delaying the election and extended period of
caretaker government, providing the necessary period for foreign governments and
multilateral institutions to implement perquisites for a thriving democracy.
Scholarship has questioned on the potential of democratic institutional structures and
dynamics on the potency to create ethnic division and violence. This is not to assume that
features of authoritarian regimes have any less likelihood or ability to create such
scenarios. Yet does democracy create nationalism is the question that came to be
addressed by scholars such as Spencer (2008) in whose study of the “illiberal
consequences of liberal institutions in Sri Lanka” argued;
… the origin of ethnic divide between Sinhala and Tamil, and much of peculiar nastiness of the
past 20 years of conflict lies in the institutional structure and working dynamic of representative
democracy in Sri Lanka.

The view, as in instrumentalism, can be explained by the presence of self-interest
politicians using nationalist appeals to contend for power; and in that process, the agents
utilizing such opportunity might not be any less potent or constrained in the democratic
system than in an authoritarian one. Linz (1990) echoed a similar view on the impact of
institutional arrangements; the presidentialism, which Sri Lanka had switched from the
parliamentary model, can create unstable democratic regimes due to the rigidity, and
potential dual legitimacy and regime crises that can arrive with unexpected
developments. These are “ranging from the death of the incumbent to the judgment
committed under the pressure of unruly circumstances.” It is also argued that
presidentialism in democratic systems are stuffed with paradoxes between latent
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suspicion of executive authority and personification of power with the plebiscitarian
claim to the legitimacy.
H2: Higher level of executive constraint contributes to a higher level of conflict recovery.
The main interest of this project is not to find whether autocratic or democratic
regimes are more likely to go to any war or commit atrocities than their respective
counterpart and intermediary systems. It is rather what happens after the war in with
various fates and degrees of performance in state-building efforts. The relationship
between democracy and economic development and stability is one of the most
immensely studied subjects in political science with varieties of both overlapping and
contradictory models (Boix and Stokes 2007). Valid arguments have been made on the
existence of the strong correlation between democracy and development (Lipset 1959;
Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003). Hence, the following hypothesis
is addressed:
H3: Higher levels of democracy contributes to a higher level of conflict recovery.
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CHAPTER III: DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To examine the recovery relative to each country’s regime characteristics and
ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, I used the existing data accounting the conflict
episodes from Correlates of War (COW) Project and the corresponding available data
conceptualizing the country’s recovery. While it is difficult to accurately measure a
state’s recovery from conflict, the positive change in the annual Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita is the most available conceptual measurements as a proxy to determine
a country’s recovery. COW’s post-1945 conflicts are matched by corresponding
Maddison Historical Statistics’ MDP version 2018 accounting annual GDP data for each
relevant state as the unit of analysis. Alesina et al. (2003)’s analysis of Ethno-LinguisticReligious (ELR) Fractionalization and Systemic Peace’s Polity IV data are retrieved for
diversity and regime characteristics data respectively.
Survival Analysis
I use Cox proportional hazard model to determine the effect of covariates on the
conflict recovery. In this case, a state’s recovery from the conflict is studied as a proxy of
its state-building. I designated Ethno-Linguistic-Religious (ELR) Fractionalization and
Regime Characteristics determined by polity score and components as relevant
explanatory variables in the survival analysis. Furthermore, four additional variables are
also added as the potential determinants of survival. These are the duration of the conflict
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by year, pre-conflict income status determined by GDP per capita in 2011 USD, and
conflict intensity determined by the ratio of pre-conflict GDP per capita and lowest GDP
per capita during the conflict. The annual GDP per capita growth is added to ensure the
accuracy of the model’s testing in my analysis as higher growth rate should reflect higher
chance of recovery.
Case Selection
The relevant cases are selected from Correlates of War (COW)’s list of postWorld War II conflict episodes. I did not differentiate between COW’s categorization of
Inter-state, intra-state, non-state or extra-state wars. This is because all wars impact the
state negatively. If two or more episodes take place simultaneously within a state, or if
another conflict recommences by one year, they are counted as one episode. An example
of these is Angolan Guerilla War of 1974-1975, War of Angola of 1975-1976, Angolan
Control War of 1976-1991, and Angolan War of the Cities of 1992-1994 have taken
place simultaneously within the territory of Angola. Interstate conflicts taking place in
two sovereign territories are expanded and each counted as two cases. An example of
these is the Korean War of 1950-1953 where the war took place in the territories of both
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North) and Republic of Korea
(ROK/South). Conflicts that have taken place in more than two sovereign territories are
censored from analysis due to the possible complication that may cause by the dilution of
its overall intensity into multiple states. An example of these is Arab-Israeli War of 19481949 which took place in the State of Israel, the British Mandate of Palestine, the Sinai
Peninsula of the Kingdom of Egypt and southern territories of the Lebanese Republic.
The cases without corresponding available MDP’s GDP data are also excluded. Examples
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of these include the conflicts that have taken place in the territories of the State of Eritrea
and the Federal Republic of Somalia.
The case selection in my analysis allowed for 809-817 observations of recovering
years; the observations containing Polity IV’s categorization of the state’s authority into
cases of foreign interruption (-66), interregnum or anarchy (77) and transition (-88) are
also deleted. This is to prevent the potential contamination of the results by these
numerical values. An example of these is the recovery period of the War of Bosnian
Independence of 1992 and subsequent Bosnian-Serb Rebellion of 1992-1995. The
outcomes of these wars put Bosnia and Herzegovina under the NATO-led multinational
Implementation Force (IFOR) for Dayton Peace Accords. IFOR is then succeeded by
multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR) and United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) until the termination of the mission’s mandate in 2002 by
UNSC Resolution 1423.
Measuring Recovery
The measure of conflict recovery is determined by the positive change in the
country’s post-conflict GDP. I use a similar approach used by Flores & Nooruddin (2009)
who determined that the country be considered economically recovered from conflict
once it reestablished the pattern of consumption and investment before the conflict. I
determine the rate of conflict recovery by the year of change from t2 to t1, the first being
the year after the conflict has ended and t1 being the year when the country reaches back
to the level of the GDP per capita prior to the breakdown of conflict. Alternatively, the
year when another conflict episode begins in which the case is counted as relapsed. As
Flores & Nooruddin argued, a conflict may take place as the result of deteriorating
13

economy; therefore, the highest annual GDP per capita within the five years before the
conflict should be taken as the recovery threshold; I followed the similar strategy. If no
data for a country are available within the five years, I used the closest available previous
year data for the country’s year in which conflict had commenced.
Limitations of GDP Measurement
The use of GDP for conflict recovery measurement possesses its limitations; the
scrutiny of its dependability for the measure of conflict intensity in advance to my data
analysis found that several cases, such as Colombian, Sri Lankan, Nepalese, and Burmese
civil wars, did not demonstrate any retraction of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in
the years of the ongoing internal conflicts. This may be because of a conflict could be
geographically confined to a portion of the country that may not be economically
significant, or a war may instead be slow-burning, and its overall intensity is diluted over
a long period of time. While the challenges of internal validity are present with the use of
GDP as a country’s economic performance is subjected for a wide variety of factors, its
viability in measuring the country’s level of consumption, investment, net export and
public expenditures remains the practical tool to conceptualize post-conflict recovery
rate, and the dataset’s coverage of necessary timeframes and countries allows for
strengthening the external validity of the analysis for the generalization more than other
possible alternative measurements which data availability does not provide necessary
timeframe as much as GDP data.
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

My analyses of 107 cases consisting of 616 observations by year are categorized
into four parts. The first part (Table 1.) consists of polity and two of its components, as
well as three economic variables as relevant covariates along with fractionalizations. The
second part (Table 2.) of my analysis examined the interactions of the regime types and
fractionalizations. This is achieved by the multiplication of polity score and ELR
Fractionalizations in each observation. All covariates consisted of the first analysis are
then added. The results of the first analysis support the expected impact of
fractionalizations on post-conflict recovery; supporting Hypothesis 1. The higher degree
of ethnic fractionalization is found to contribute to a longer duration of recovery.
Likewise, a higher level of language diversity is also associated with worse prognosis
with a coefficient of -0.844. While religious fractionalization demonstrates similar
prognosis with the negative coefficient of hazard analysis, the impact is not statistically
insignificant. The higher polity score is associated with longer duration until conflict
recovery, contrary to Hypotheses 2. However, the higher degree of executive constraints
and political competitiveness are found to reduce the risk and are associated with better
prognosis of conflict recovery, supporting Hypotheses 3. The detailed findings are shown
in Table1.
As in the case of first part of the analysis, the results of my second part of the
analysis containing interactive variables between polity and fractionalization also reject

15

the idea on the positive impact of higher polity score on post-conflict recovery. However,
the interactions of the higher degree of democracy and fractionalizations do not have any
statistical significances in Ethno-linguistic fractionalizations models. The detailed
findings are shown in Table 2. The interaction between religious fractionalization and the
higher polity score is found to have a negative impact on the state recovery with
statistical significance.
The third and fourth parts of my analyses stemmed from the attempt to eliminate
collinearities between the polity score and its components of executive constraint and
political competitiveness. This is achieved by taking out the components’ values from the
polity score. Center for Systemic Peace’s polity score is measured by subtracting
“institutionalized autocracy” score from “institutionalized democracy” score (Marshall
and Jagger, 2002). I extracted the relevant weighted scales of executive constraint and
political competitiveness scores from both institutionalized autocracy and
institutionalized democracy scores, and the overall polity score is readjusted. Therefore,
the readjusted polity score does not include executive constraint’s scale weight, nor
competitiveness of political participation + regulation of political participation which
measures political competitiveness in Polity IV. This reduces potential multicollinearities.
The results of analyses with the adjusted polity score are similar to the previous
parts of analyses. However, coefficient values were slightly reduced with adjusted polity
score analyses and some variables lost their statistical significance. Table 3 shows the
analysis by individual fractionalization variables while Table 4 shows the results of the
interaction between fractionalizations and adjusted polity score variables. Both results
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echo the trends shown by analyses with normal polity score – which higher
fractionalization and polity tend to have a negative impact on recovery while executive
constraints and political competitiveness are positive.
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Table 1. Coefficient and Hazard Ratios of Fractionalizations and Regime Characteristics as Prognosis Factors of Conflict
Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Fractionalization Covariates
Covariates

Ethnic Fractionalization

Linguistic Fractionalization

Fractionalization

-1.169

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.311
**

Polity
Executive Constraints
Political Competitiveness

-0.273
0.434
0.232

0.761
1.543
1.261

***
*
**

-0.249
0.382
0.200

0.779
1.466
1.222

***
*
*

-0.247
0.371
0.208

0.781
1.450
1.232

***
*
*

Conflict Durations
GDP per capita
High-Low GDP Ratio

0.105
0.498
-1.864

1.111
1.645
0.155

***
***
***

0.110
0.496
-1.919

1.116
1.642
0.146

***
***
***

0.082
0.570
-1.810

1.086
1.768
0.163

**
***
***

Coefficient
-0.844

Coefficient
-0.152

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.858

18

Coefficient

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.429
*

Religious Fractionalization

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

Table 2. Coefficients and Hazard Ratios of Interactions between Fractionalizations and Polity as Prognosis Factors of Conflict
Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Interactive Covariates
Covariates

Ethnic Fractionalization

Linguistic Fractionalization

Fractionalization x Polity
Fractionalization

-0.125
-1.544

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.881
0.213
**

Polity
Executive Constraints
Political Competitiveness

-0.205
0.384
0.225

0.814
1.468
1.253

*
*
**

-0.280
0.417
0.203

0.755
1.517
1.225

***
**
*

-0.127
0.308
0.283

0.880
1.361
1.328

.
*
***

Conflict Durations
GDP per capita
High-Low GDP Ratio

0.116
0.455
-1.853

1.123
1.577
0.156

***
**
***

0.101
0.498
-1.862

1.106
1.645
0.155

***
***
***

0.107
0.595
-1.829

1.113
1.814
0.160

***
***
***

Coefficient
0.060
-0.767

Coefficient
-0.348
-0.589

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.705
***
0.554
**
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Coefficient

Exponentiated
Coefficient
1.061
0.464
*

Religious Fractionalization

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

Table 3. Coefficient and Hazard Ratios of Fractionalizations and Regime Characteristics as Prognosis Factors of Conflict
Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Fractionalization Covariates and Adjusted Polity Score
Ethnic Fractionalization

Fractionalization

-1.165

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.312
**

Adjusted Polity

-0.284

0.753

Executive Constraints
Political Competitiveness

0.122
0.022

1.130
1.022

Conflict Durations
GDP per capita
High-Low GDP Ratio

0.105
0.487
-1.870

1.110
1.628
0.154

Coefficient

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

***

***
***
***

Linguistic Fractionalization
Coefficient
-0.841

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.431
*

-0.258

0.772

0.098
0.010

1.103
1.010

0.110
0.486
-1.918

1.116
1.626
0.147

***

***
***
***

Religious Fractionalization
Coefficient
-0.093

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.911

-0.259

0.772

0.088
0.021

1.091
1.021

0.082
0.562
-1.813

1.085
1.755
0.163

**

**
***
***
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Covariates

Table 4. Coefficients and Hazard Ratios of Interactions between Fractionalizations and Polity as Prognosis Factors of Conflict
Recovery, Survival Analysis by Individual Interactive Covariates and Adjusted Polity Score
Covariates

Ethnic Fractionalization

Linguistic Fractionalization

Fractionalization x Polity
Fractionalization

-0.128
-1.179

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.879
0.308
**

Polity

-0.220

0.802

-0.326

0.722

Executive Constraints
Political Competitiveness

0.114
0.021

1.121
1.021

0.113
0.008

1.120
1.008

Conflict Durations

0.108

1.114

***

0.105

1.111

GDP per capita
High-Low GDP Ratio

0.472
-1.860

1.604
0.156

***
***

0.494
-1.883

1.639
0.152

Coefficient
0.147
-0.890

Exponentiated
Coefficient
1.159
0.411
*
**

Coefficient
-1.154
-0.234

Exponentiated
Coefficient
0.315
***
0.791

0.164

1.178

-0.006
0.090

0.994
1.094

***

0.108

1.114

***

***
***

0.570
-1.869

1.769
0.154

***
***
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Coefficient

Religious Fractionalization

Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, . p < 0.1

CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION

The findings suggest that higher polity score to be associated with longer duration
of conflict recovery. This negative effect of higher polity is also consistent in its
interactions with ethnic and religious fractionalization factors. The individual effect of
ethnic fractionalization is found to have a negative impact on conflict recovery. It is
therefore conclusive that both ethnolinguistic heterogeneities and higher polity score have
a negative impact on state-building, the higher degree of executive constraints and
political competitiveness can counteract the adverse prognosis effect and contributes to
state-building. The findings relating to the effect of various polity components could give
interesting insights into the institutional arrangement and functionality’s impact on statebuilding processes in post-conflict states. The positive impact of polity component
conceptualizing the regulation of the central bureaucracy’s chief executive suggest the
potential presence of un-named influential factor and its significant role in the causal
process and mechanism. I identified this factor by looking at the concepts of what these
components measure.
As Polity IV conceptualizes the constraint on the chief executive power to be that
of “institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectivities.” (Marshall & Jagger 2002). These constraints are imposed
by “accountability groups” that may be the legislature in a western democracy, or “the
ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies;
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the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.”
Thus, the conceptual measure of the executive constraint components is concerned with
the checks and balances that directly relates to the decision-rule power of the chief
executive. The measure of overall polity, which is a factor found to have a negative
impact on conflict recovery in my analysis, composed of broader concepts. Polity IV’s
conceptualization of the polity includes the score of the mentioned constraints on the
chief executive office; however, the overall polity score is also derived from other
distinct components such as dynamics of regulation and openness of chief executive
recruitments. Therefore, the combined measure of the polity includes sub-components
and features not covered by the scope of the executive constraint component captures.
The components covered by the polity, such as the popular election of chief executive
might substantial negative effect in ethnically diverse countries. Popular election would
mean that the majority wins; in ethnically fractionalized societies, these might have
potential to pose higher grievances or conflict. Although the current scope of this
research project have not analyzed the competitiveness of the executive recruitment, the
measured components complementary to democracy and representation are found to
associate with state-building. These are competitive political participation and chief
executive parity or subordination.
Considering these distinctions, it is therefore conclusive that while the overall
unchecked power of the central bureaucracy’s chief office contributes to the risk of
relapse into violence and weaken state-building, the higher institutional constraint on
chief executive office solely measuring the chief executive's decision-rule power can
positively impact the conflict recovery and state-building. The un-named influential
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factor is, therefore, the effect of power centralization. Furthermore, the higher level of
political competitiveness’s contribution toward state-building, consistent with arguments
that representations and lower of the level of political exclusions are also argued to be
reduction factors of ethnic tensions, grievances, and conflicts (Cederman et. al 2013).
This is particularly relevant in ethnically heterogeneous states. I use these two concepts
of dynamics of representation and power centralization in the formulation of my theory to
demonstrate the potential causal process and mechanism of the conflict recovery that is
used as a proxy to understand both state-building and state-weakness.
Institutional Feedback Model: A Formula of State-Weakness
I propose institutional feedback model as a way to systematically understand
state-weakness, considering Horizontal Power Centralization and Representation as
determinants of institutional feedback process. The concept of the horizontal power
centralization and representation means the roles and interaction of these two notions:
power centralization and representation in operation at the national level. This is also to
recognize the scope and limitation of my project which does not include the analysis of
federal-unitary dimensions of the state. The dynamics of centralization-decentralizations
have long been argued to be significant to state-building and its relationship to ethnic
aspects of a state. Moreover, if any significant effects are found to exist through the
similar approach, the relationships involving the various levels of government and the
devolutions of power may be considered vertical. Meanwhile, the decision-rule efficiency
and representation of the regime at the national level in my analysis are horizontal. The
interactions between these two aspects in state-building feedback mechanism in my
argument are laid out in the following formula:
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F = – e (r – f)
while
F = feedback, e = chief executive power, r = representation, and f = fractionalization

The feedback process refers to the occurrence whose operation influence the
institutional strength and weakness in its process. The feedback mechanism is a system
whose outputs routed back as inputs as part of a chain cause and effect circular
relationship.2 In the positive feedback, the increased output creates increased input, which
then creates more increased output. The positive feedback accelerates a process, while
negative feedback does the opposite by reacting the input in a way to inhibit the output.
The negative feedback, therefore, stabilize the internal equilibrium. This feedback
relationship, well-established in other scientific disciplines, is also adopted by my
argument to understand the cause-and-effect process of institutional weakness and
failure. In the scenario where representation (r) < fractionalization (f); r = lower, f =
higher
Formula: F = – e (r – f)
➢ F = – e (lower – higher)
➢ F = – e (– representation)
➢ F = + product
➢ Positive feedback process

2

The idea of feedback process date back to 18th century Britain in economic theory. It is also applied in
engineering, biological and other scientific disciplines.
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The output of positive feedback increases the input and in the long run, produces
institutional instability. The output of less representation and higher fractionalization
would be an ethnic grievance accumulating ethnic tensions as a contributing factor to the
state-weakness.

Figure 1. Positive Feedback Process in Ethnic Adhesion

In the negative feedback system, the output is inhibited by the regulation of the
input. In our example, if the level of representation is higher than fractionalization, the
resulting product would be negative, giving way to the negative feedback system. The
example of this demonstrated as follow; representation (r) > fractionalization (f); r =
higher, f = lower
Formula: F = – e (r – f)
➢ F = – e (higher – lower)
➢ F = – e (+representation)
➢ F = – product
➢ negative feedback process
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The output of negative feedback is one that is decelerated after the regulation of the input.
In our example of the negative feedback process, the ethnic adhesions and grievances
would be intervened and regulated by surplus representation factors which as an example,
may facilitate negotiations or power sharing. This may result in the reduction of ethnic
tensions, and the final resulting output does not contribute to the state-weakness.

Figure 2. Negative Feedback Process

Representation means the activity of facilitating the citizen’s voices, concerns,
opinions, views, and perspective present in policy-making processes. While a minimal
amount of representation may exist in other regime types, the activity of representation is
central and vital to a democracy. These activities are facilitated by the democratic
institutional mechanisms of the regime such check and balances of power, protection of
citizen’s rights, functioning legislatures with the elected representatives, the political
parties and freedom of political participation and expression. In the ethnically and
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linguistically fractured states, the institutional arrangements facilitating the representation
of the diverse groups of people’s voices, concerns and opinions must also take alongside
sufficient degree of power-sharing and autonomy. The examples of these forms of
governments are federations, confederation or consociations. These arrangements ease
the output of ethnic adhesion, reducing the effect of grievances. The failure to address
these concerns and voices by the lack of the institutional arrangement or through
systematic discrimination or suppression may lead to the accumulation of ethnic
grievances without the regulation by representation effect and mechanisms.
The positive feedback process, by contributing to dynamic equilibrium rather than
stability could lead to two potential outcomes. The first potential outcome would be state
failure. The breakdown of state may be contributed by the event of institutional
thresholds such as an outbreak of war, revolution or regime change. Syria after the Arab
Spring and Iraq after the 2001 occupation is an example of such a process outcome.
Being highly fractionalized multiethnic polities, the ethno-religious divisions are long
present in both countries and in the region as a whole (Reilly 2019; Lynch 2016; Rosen
2010). The outbreak of the Arab Spring served as the intuitional threshold event in Syria
that led to state failure and its ongoing civil war is highly sectarian in nature (Potter
2014). Likewise, the regime change facilitated by the US occupation of Iraq served as
institutional threshold event that led to state failure mired in interethnic and interreligious conflict continues to dominate the Iraqi political landscape. The second or more
optimistic outcome would be facilitating escape route highly reliant upon instrumentalist
agency intervention that promotes assembling of institutional mechanisms to mitigate the
grievances. These may range from efforts to set up inter-ethnic or inter-religious
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dialogues promoting the cross-cultural understanding, peace process, and devolution to
regime restructure that open door for more representation and power-sharing among
conflicting groups. The new institutional arrangements of Bosnia and Herzegovina after
the Bosnian War of 1992 and 1995 serve as an example of an escape route. The effort to
restore peace and order in Bosnia were multi-faceted including the foreign intervention,
peace accords, and justice mechanisms, as well as a new institutional arrangement that
sought to find the solution to underlying ethnic grievances. The present-day political
structure of Bosnian state made up of two autonomous and formerly warring entities:
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska serves as the example of an
outcome facilitated by the escape route from dynamic equilibrium states.

Figure 3. Positive Feedback Outcomes
State Failure
Dynamic equilibrium

Positive Feedback
Successful agency’s
intervention

Escape Route

Stability

Recommendation for Future Studies
It can be expected from future venues of research for improvements in both the
measures and the method in the understanding of the dynamics of the argued horizontal
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representation and power centralization impact on state-building. More importantly, the
expansion of the existing findings on regime types and post-conflict state-building is
recommended. This means the inclusion of the examination of various patterns of
democracy and representation such as the potential implications of the differing practices
of consensus and majoritarian democracy in the various country and the interaction of
these practices to the existing ethnic dynamics and compositions. The expansion of this
research may also be complemented by including the focus on vertical representation and
power centralization. These include looking at the degrees and fashions of federalism and
decentralization and their interaction with the ethnic dynamics of both fractionalizations,
grouping and territorial settlement aspects.
Multinational states are significantly different from multiethnic yet nonmultinational states. Countries such as the United States are composed of multiple
ethnicities, but no ethnic group possesses the tradition of national self-determination
implicated by the territorial claims. The opposite case is true in the countries such of
former Yugoslavia, China, Canada, Russia and Myanmar where secessionism continues
to be the reality. The presence of these dimensions along with the political institutional
arrangement from national to the regional level and their influence on representation and
decision-efficiency which may impact the state-building processes are the interesting
topics to study in the future. While ELR Fractionalization data only account for the
degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the state, the existing
measurement such as the ETH Zurich Ethnic-Power Relation (EPR)’s Core dataset to be
examined the size and power access of ethnic groups in each state.
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The territorial dimension of ethnic diversity and fractionalization can first be
examined by studying the administrative division and their attachment of to a national
ethnic group. This is in the case of Myanmar whose administrative divisions composed of
seven regions, seven states, five self-administrative zones (SAZs), and one selfadministrative division (SAD). While seven regions are considered mainland Burma
mostly populated by ethnic Burman, the remaining seven states, five SAZs and one SAD
are named after each relevant major national minorities and ethnic groups. However, the
actual ethnic settlements patterns in a state may not reflect its administrative divisions.
For example, China’s rapid economic development has facilitated higher internal
migration and interminglement of its ethnic groups (Zhu & Blanchford 2006). This can
be solved by using ETH’s Georeferencing of Ethnic Power-Relation (GeoEPR)
accounting the spatial configurations of ethnic concentration. These are important as to
consider the political phenomena and conditions relating to ethnicity and territory, as well
as the degrees and fashions of different types of ethnolinguistic diversity that exist in the
state. The creation of GeoEPR dataset was also associated with the study and its finding
that settle far away from the capital city and close to the border (Wucherpfennig 2011).
This is also true both in the case of the multinational state of Myanmar where the concept
of ethnicity draggles with territoriality and the country host one of the world’s longestrunning civil conflicts. This may be further contributed by the lack of effort to solve
ethnic grievances under the nearly six centuries of military dictatorship with centralized
unitary power arrangement.
Furthermore, better measures conceptualizing the state-building and strength are
needed to complement or replace the use of post-conflict GDP are needed to control
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endogeneity in the analysis and results. These may be possible by single or combined use
of existing measures such as the World Bank’s Gross National Income (GNI) measure
and components, Government Effectiveness Indicators, Correlates of War’s National
Material Capabilities (NMC), Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index (FSI) and OECD’s
State of Fragility reports. The use of these measures to conceptualize the state-building in
the future research may mean the sacrificing the larger sample size to resort to a smaller
sample analysis in consideration the timeframe of these indices may cover. However, this
can be compensated by the inclusion of countries with or without the experience of
conflict for statistical analysis other than the hazard models. As indices of state fragility
directly measure the state effectiveness, the use of change in GDP after the conflict as a
proxy to capture the state-building process may not be necessary. The measure on
decentralization can be retrieved from the existing indices of various decentralization
practices including in fiscal, political, and administrative. While the power given to
national administrative sub-units by constitutional or legal arrangements may be
beneficial in understanding the different vertical power dynamics, the reality of these
practices may not reflect the actual provisions in the diverse range of countries. The
standardized measurements such as IMF’s fiscal decentralization index, accounting for
revenue collection and expenditures at various levels of government, are more
appropriate for the cross-countries quantitative analysis and comparison.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

The implication of my findings points to the fact that democracy defined as a
system to facilitate popular election and majority rule may not be sufficient to resolve
underlying problems for effective state-building in ethnolinguistically fractionalized
polities. It is found that while fractionalization and higher overall polity IV score are
associated with longer duration of conflict recovery, the higher constraints on chief
executive power, also known as centralized decision-rule, as well as the higher political
competitiveness are associated with better prognosis. Therefore, while fractionalizations
generally have a negative impact on the state-building, the negative effect must be
compensated by surplus representation and power-sharing effects. The purpose of these
emphases is to not implicate the partial findings of this project to promote ethnic
homogeneity or reducing fractionalizations, but to highlight the importance of
representations in the political processes in fractionalized societies. Any attempt to
reduce the ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity in a state would be unfavorable and
have extremely severe ethical implications. If any policy recommendations are to be
derived from this research, it should only be to promote higher representation and less
marginalization of any group in a society. This higher representation effect is created by
democratic institutions that facilitate the citizen’s voices, concerns, representation in
policy-making and processes, as well as sufficient degrees of check, balances and
autonomy as significantly important factors. The lack of these institutional mechanisms
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creates positive feedbacks leading to the dynamic equilibrium in system operation
contributing to state weakness. Future research can include more comprehensive focus on
federal-unitary dimension with designated variables to expand this knowledge.
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